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In the introduction to the special issue “The Neural Underpinnings of Vicarious
Experience” the editors state that one “may feel embarrassed when witnessing another
making a social faux pas”. In our commentary we address this statement and ask
whether this example introduces a vicarious or an empathic form of embarrassment.
We elaborate commonalities and differences between these two forms of emotional
experiences and discuss their underlying mechanisms. We suggest that both, vicarious
and empathic emotions, originate from the simulation processesmirroring andmentalizing
that depend on anchoring and adjustment. We claim the term “empathic emotion” to
be reserved exclusively for incidents where perceivers and social targets have shared
affective experience, whereas “vicarious emotion” offers a wider scope and also includes
non-shared affective experiences. Both are supposed to be highly functional in social
interactions.
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INTRODUCTION
The human ability to infer others’ emotions, thoughts or
intentions is a central mechanism in creating meaningful social
interactions. Accordingly, the question of how we develop a rep-
resentation of our interaction partners’ minds and emotions has
been the focus of various disciplines such as social psychology,
philosophy, anthropology, and biology. In the last decade the
social neurosciences, specifically, have put tremendous efforts
into disentangling the neural networks involved in this ability.
Most of this research has concentrated on the phenomenon of
“empathy.” Empathy has been defined as the state where people
(i.e., perceivers1) represent the same emotion they are observing or
imagining in another person (i.e., social targets) with full aware-
ness that the source of their own experience is the other’s emotion
(De Vignemont and Singer, 2006). However, empathy only refers
to a small amount of vicarious emotions people may experi-
ence while interacting with their social environment in everyday
life (Singer and Lamm, 2009). With this commentary, we aim
to broaden this perspective by proposing a clear-cut distinction
between vicarious and empathic emotions, with the latter being a
specific case of the first and both being mediated by two streams
of simulation processes.
TWO PROCESSES OF UNDERSTANDING OTHERS’
EMOTIONS: MIRRORING ANDMENTALIZING
Mainly, two interacting processes have been proposed that allow
perceivers to empathize (Keysers and Gazzola, 2007; Waytz and
Mitchell, 2011). First, mirroring processes have been described as
1Zaki and Ochsner (2011) described individuals focusing on someone else as
“perceivers” and individuals being in the focus of the perceivers’ attention as
‘social targets’. For the present article we take on this labeling and will refer to
perceiver and social target in the following.
a direct mapping of another’s observed actions and bodily states
in one’s own (i.e., the perceiver’s) neural system that allow sharing
the target’s feelings in an embodied manner. Second, mentaliz-
ing processes which have been proposed to lead to comparable
internal representations in perceivers, however, via a projection of
oneself into the target’s position (Keysers and Gazzola, 2007; Hein
and Singer, 2008). Mentalizing thus involves imagining oneself
in the same situation as the social target and helps to “intu-
itively” (Keysers and Gazzola, 2007) grasp the target’s emotions
as if they were one’s own bodily states. These processes, mirroring
and mentalizing, can be understood as forms of internal simula-
tion that allow perceivers to experience another person’s state on
one’s own body (see Waytz and Mitchell, 2011).
In order to shed light onto the neural mechanisms of these
two processes to simulate the target’s emotional state, the funda-
mental idea of these approaches is to compare neuronal networks
involved in first-hand experiences of emotions or sensations (e.g.,
provoking pain or disgust through administration of electro-
shocks or unpleasant odors, respectively) with the neuronal
networks engaged while observing emotions or sensations in
interaction partners (Wicker et al., 2003; Singer et al., 2004; Jabbi
et al., 2007). Overlap in cortical activation between these exper-
imental conditions is then interpreted as evidence for shared,
“isomorphic” 2 affective states between interaction partners and
2In the neurosciences the term isomorphism might be understood with at
least two different meanings: on the one hand, “isomorphic” patterns of
information refer to the similar firing of mirror neurons during self-initiated
actions and the observation of corresponding actions of others thus allow-
ing computational predictions. On the other hand, in the context of empathy
research the term “isomorphism” has been used to describe similar affec-
tive states between targets and perceivers (De Vignemont and Singer, 2006).
Whereas the earlier usage refers to the micro-level of information processing
in the brain, the latter describes the subjective level of affective experiences.
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thus as a neuronal manifestation of empathy (Wicker et al., 2003;
Gallese et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2004; Jackson et al., 2006).
Irrespective of the underlying processes, neuroscience research
has shown that the anterior insula and the anterior cingulate cor-
tex are most robustly involved in common mapping of one’s own
and another’s affective states during empathic experiences (Craig,
2009; Lamm and Singer, 2010).
Depending on the available input, perceivers rely on sensory
[i.e., mirroring of gestures, mimics, bodily postures, sounds etc.
in a near-simultaneous isomorphic fashion (Waytz and Mitchell,
2011)] and/or contextual information (i.e., mentalizing using
semantic information, prior knowledge, past experiences in sim-
ilar situations etc.) in order to represent another person’s state
(Waytz andMitchell, 2011; Zaki and Ochsner, 2011). Among oth-
ers, the premotor cortex and primary as well as higher order
somatosensory cortices are thought to mediate the mirroring
process (Avenanti et al., 2005). Mentalizing is typically associ-
ated with medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), temporal pole, and
superior temporal sulcus activation (Hein and Singer, 2008).
Within the mentalizing network, the mPFC has been specifi-
cally linked to reflective processes about oneself and another
(Mitchell et al., 2005) or imagining oneself in past and future
events (Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Schacter et al., 2007). This
supports the conceptualization of mentalizing as a process where
perceivers project themselves into to the position of the social
target.
DISSOCIATING VICARIOUS AND EMPATHIC EMOTIONS
The processes to infer the “physically invisible but psychologi-
cally real, internal state” (Zaki and Ochsner, 2011; p.159) can also
result in “vicarious emotions” that are simulated in the absence
of this specific emotional state in the social target. Although the
terms “empathic emotions” (Batson, 1981; Lamm et al., 2007a;
Hein and Singer, 2008; Pfeifer et al., 2008; Engen and Singer,
2012; Zaki and Ochsner, 2012) and “vicarious emotions” (Batson
et al., 1987; Decety and Lamm, 2006; Keysers and Gazzola, 2009;
Meyer et al., 2012; Niedenthal and Brauer, 2012) have been used
with near identical meaning, we consider both concepts to have
distinctive characteristics and consequences. This distinction is
easily illustrated on the basis of vicarious embarrassment: in
many social encounters perceivers feel vicariously embarrassed
in the absence of embarrassment or any other emotion in the
social target3 (Hawk et al., 2011; Krach et al., 2011; Müller-Pinzler
et al., 2012; Paulus et al., 2013). Thus, the social target is unaware
about the ongoing threats to her social integrity in this situation
(Krach et al., 2011). Consequently, in contrast to empathic man-
ifestations, vicarious embarrassment reflects an emotional state
in the perceiver that does not match the internal, psychologi-
cally real state of the social target. Nonetheless, recent studies
provided first evidence that similar processes of mentalizing and
In the present manuscript we use the term “isomorphism” with the latter
meaning.
3For example, vicarious embarrassment is experienced by attendees of a sci-
entific conference when they observe the presenter of a talk returning from
the rest room not realizing that toilet paper is sticking out of the back of her
pants.
mirroring contribute to the perceiver’s vicarious embarrassment
(Hawk et al., 2011; Krach et al., 2011).
We have previously discussed how mentalizing can result in
vicarious emotions that do not match the emotional state of
the social target (Krach et al., 2011). This has been explained
through self-projections of perceivers who transpose themselves
into the position of others thereby integrating their own perspec-
tive within the mental simulation (Hawk et al., 2011). However,
for several reasons, the mapping of the social target’s state in the
perceiver’s neural network throughmirroring processes is also not
independent of the perceiver’s perspective. First, similar to the
processing of sensory information of one’s own body (Gazzola
et al., 2012), mirroring the target’s state in a near-simultaneous
isomorphic fashion is modulated by other processes such as men-
talizing. This is particularly important in social contexts that
constrain the desirability of displayed emotions (e.g., at work).
In these situations the enacted and thus mirrored expressions
could deviate from the corresponding internal psychological state.
Second, the mirror neuron functioning is deeply integrated in
a neural network that is tailored and tuned to process informa-
tion of the perceiver’s body. In the most extreme example this
is illustrated with mirror neuron activity in response to observ-
ing robotic arms grasping objects (Gazzola et al., 2007; Keysers
et al., 2010). Those robots do not have any human sensations or
form intentions about their actions, however, the perceiver’s neu-
ral system mirrors the action as if it was human. Consequently,
depending on the idiosyncratic learning experiences the mir-
rored representation should deviate across different perceivers
even if the inputs entering the system were exactly similar. These
arguments illustrate how mirroring is indeed anchored in the
characteristics of the perceiver’s neural system andmight bemod-
ulated by additional information accessible exclusively from the
observer’s perspective. The resulting simulation of the social tar-
get’s state through mirroring processes could represent a genuine
vicarious emotion. Previous research has already demonstrated
such automated vicarious responses while e.g., observing numbed
limbs that undergo biopsy (Lamm et al., 2007b).
These thoughts raise the question of whether vicarious in
comparison to empathic emotional experiences may serve a use-
ful function in social interactions or have to be considered as
the result of immature and maladapted processes to represent-
ing another person’s internal psychological state. With the help
of some examples we argue that these vicarious emotions may
indeed provide useful information for perceivers, enable helping
behavior, and foster social interactions. First, vicarious emotions
contribute to the social regulation of the perceiver’s behavior. For
instance, many forms of psychological punishment are used as an
“example” to induce avoidance of disobedience from norms, even
if the social target does not respond to the situation. Perceivers
will nonetheless do so and vicariously experience the suffering
in that situation. Second, imagine observing the above described
non-embarrassed presenter who is currently unaware of the
ongoing threat to her social integrity. For perceivers, their vicar-
ious emotional response provides insights about the severity of
the threat to the image of the social target. This internal vicarious
representation of the unfavorable condition may help to motivate
interventions from the perceivers’ side in order to re-establish the
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social integrity of the target. In contrast, perceivers who are tied to
an empathically accurate response that matches the internal psy-
chological state of the target may be less prone to develop such
motivations. Similarly, with regards to observing physical injuries
to another’s body, vicarious pain experiences, even in the absence
of a psychological state of pain in the target, might provide vital
information for initiating costly helping behaviors (Hein et al.,
2010).
This line of argumentation supports the notion that human
beings are not only passive perceivers in the context of social inter-
actions but also active creators of shared emotional experiences.
In a natural setting, they need to be aware of their own pres-
ence and the simulated vicarious emotions in response to another
person’s condition; is it in the presence or absence of an emo-
tional state in the social target. The perceiver’s construal of a social
target’s condition as the representation of an internal, “psycho-
logically real” state might thus provide an unnecessarily narrow
scope to examining vicarious emotions. Rather, vicarious emo-
tions should be considered as the result of ongoing simulation
processes that, depending on the social context as well as personal
or task induced motivations are flexibly tuned to match another’s
internal psychological state.
The question remains if perceivers, even if they intend to,
always have correct assumptions about the emotion of the social
target. Accordingly, social neuroscience has to consider the match
or mismatch of the emotional experiences between social targets
and perceivers from two perspectives: first, the de facto match or
mismatch of the emotions between the perceiver and the social
target, and second, the subjective stance of the perceiver about
the match or mismatch with the social target’s emotions. In social
interactions both perspectives may occur independently of each
other, resulting in four different states (for examples see Figure 1).
The neural responses should not differ between de facto and
subjective empathic and vicarious emotions, respectively. The
transition from one of the states to another might nonetheless
offer great potential for unraveling yet neglected neural processes
in social interactions. This is especially important considering
upcoming second-person neuroscience paradigms that allow the
investigation of true social interactions (Krach et al., in press;
Schilbach et al., in press).
A PROCESS ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE ON VICARIOUS
EMOTIONS
Ideas how to conceptually explain vicarious emotions can be
derived from recent efforts in social psychology. Several behav-
ioral studies have examined the process of understanding others’
minds. Those studies indicate that people adopt others’ perspec-
tives by initially anchoring on their own perspective and then
serially adjusting their internal representation to account for dif-
ferences between themselves and others (Epley et al., 2004). This
understanding has been mostly applied in context of cognitive
inferences on another person’s knowledge or attitudes but might
be easily applicable for examining the neural underpinnings of
vicarious emotions as well. In a shared social environment, per-
ceivers have access to different inputs (i.e., internal and external,
see Figure 2) allowing to simulate the social target’s state. We have
outlined above how both streams of simulation, mirroring and
mentalizing, are anchored in the egocentric perspective of the per-
ceiver. The social context then defines how the initial simulation
needs to get adjusted in order to provide the foundation for suc-
cessful social interactions. Depending on the appropriateness of
the initial simulation (anchoring) the readjustment process might
be more or less demanding and may finish after a “plausible”
assessment is reached (Epley and Gilovich, 2001). Notably, the
plausibility refers to both, vicarious and/or empathic emotional
experiences (Figure 2).
So far, social neuroscience has predominantly investigated
the two streams of simulation processes and their interactions
(Zaki and Ochsner, 2012). We believe that focusing on the sub-
processes of anchoring and adjusting in both streams of simula-
tion has the potential to explain vicarious and empathic emotions
in a parsimonious framework. A first fMRI study has indicated
the potential for this approach in the social neurosciences (Tamir
and Mitchell, 2010). While focusing on cognitive inferences, this
FIGURE 1 | Integrating the perceiver’s perspective in vicarious and
empathic emotions. The figure illustrates how the perceiver’s assumption
about the match of her emotions with the social target’s emotion may
dissociate from the de facto state. Notably, the neural response pattern
within each state is determined by the subjective appraisals of perceivers.
The arrows indicate the adjustment of a subjectively “incorrect” stance
during the course of social interactions (e.g., feedback of the social target) in
order to match the demands of the social context. These transitions might
specifically help to dissociate neural processes that are involved in the
adjustment and anchoring of one’s own perspective.
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FIGURE 2 | Conceptualization of vicarious and empathic emotions in a
unified framework. The figure illustrates how perceiver and social
target may interact in a shared social environment and how the
perceiver represents vicarious and empathic emotions based on
simulation processes. On the most abstract level, the input for the
simulation stems from external (e.g., gesture, mimic, prosody) or
internal sources (e.g., prior knowledge, past experiences with the
interaction partner). Simulation of internal states is realized through
two different streams, mirroring and mentalizing, which depend on
the available input. Both streams of simulation are anchored in the
perceiver’s perspective and get adjusted to obtain the adequate
outcome in the shared social environment. This can be rather
empathic and/or vicarious emotional experience.
study showed the mPFC to be specifically involved in the read-
justment process during mentalizing. We would predict similar
mPFC functioning in case of readjustment of vicarious emotions,
both during mirroring or mentalizing processes. Extending on
these findings, one can formulate more refined hypotheses on the
involvement of neural networks in simulation processes and the
specific functions of subunits within the system. These may allow
differentiating vicarious and empathic emotions on the neural
systems level and processes involved in the transitions from sub-
jective to de facto vicarious or empathic states (see Figure 1).
Here, we would predict the mPFC to play a pivotal role for remod-
eling the “incorrect” subjective state. Future studies on vicarious
or empathic emotions, however, need to address the complexity
of social situations and manipulate it to the extremes in order
to elucidate the specific neural processes involved in the different
stances.
Further, the modulatory role of contextual demands on brain
and behavior can be tested. Among others, one could model
the effects of time constraints or increased cognitive load on
the perceiver side, or alter the perceiver’s simulation by task
induced manipulations. This understanding of simulation pro-
cesses also is of clinical relevance. Instead of characterizing the
impairments in both streams of simulation, research has to con-
sider causes of clinical phenotypes on the level of anchoring and
adjustment. The source of e.g., autistic symptomatology might
rather originate from disturbed anchoring and adjustment and
the inflexibility to modulate the simulation process according to
social contextual demands (Paulus et al., 2013). Although, there
is evidence for both simulation processes to be affected in indi-
viduals with autism (see Zaki and Ochsner, 2012) a theoretical
work on autism-spectrum disorders also suggested that affected
individuals have strong egocentrically anchoring that cannot be
readjusted to the social target’s perspective (De Vignemont and
Frith, 2007) which might contribute to observed alterations in
simulation processes.
In conclusion, we provide an argument for how to distin-
guish the terms “vicarious emotions” and “empathic emotions.”
Both originate from the simulation processes mirroring and
mentalizing, however, the term “empathic emotions” should
be reserved only for incidents where perceivers and social tar-
gets have shared, “isomorphic” affective experience (Engen and
Singer, 2012). Vicarious emotions offer a wider scope and also
include non-shared affective experiences which are nonetheless
highly functional in social interactions. With several examples we
have briefly illustrated how the two streams of simulation, mir-
roring and mentalizing, are imbued by the perceiver’s perspective
which might result in both vicarious and/or empathic emotions.
In order to explain these emotional experiences in a parsimonious
framework, we think that anchoring and adjustment are the yet
neglected concepts that need to get integrated into the research
on the neural underpinnings of vicarious experience.
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